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BACK TO FUNDAMENTALS:
THE WORSENING RESULTS OF IGNORING THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT IN BALTIMORE CITY
JOHN STINSON*
In October 2002, twenty-one year-old Darrell Brooks kicked in
the door of the Dawson family home in the Oliver neighborhood of
East Baltimore. He poured gasoline on the floor of the house and set it
alight, burning the building and killing seven members of the family.1
The Dawsons, in particular the mother Angela Dawson, had
vigorously fought petty drug dealers who worked the street,
confronting them directly and reporting them to the police. 2 Brooks
was a low-level dealer who took it upon himself to get rid of what he
viewed as a problematic house of do-gooders.3 The murder of the
Dawson family received wide national attention. The event was
deemed an example of colossal and tragic failures by government
officials and law enforcement, as well as a poignant example of the
lawlessness and degradation rampant in some poor communities-and
the degree to which the larger society ignores them.4
The deaths of the Dawsons offered an opportunity for positive
change in Baltimore on a number of fronts, but instead, more than five
years later, circumstances in poor neighborhoods like Oliver appear
worse. Specifically, authorities have opted to implement "tough on
crime" policies 5 that have not resulted in reductions in wrongdoing but
have riled community mistrust. Neighborhood residents have not
banded together to follow the example of Angela Dawson to fight back
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. BA, Kenyon College; MA, Johns Hopkins University;
JD, University of Maryland School of Law.
The author would like to thank Professor Richard Boldt for his support and guidance on this
article, as well as Federal Public Defender Jim Wyda for first bringing issues around Project
EXILE to his attention. This article is dedicated to the memory of Nancy Schmidt, a neighbor
and friend in the Remington section of Baltimore. Nancy was murdered in the early moming
on April 21, 2008, while her neighbors phoned for help.
1. Gail Gibson & Laurie Willis, Tears and Remorse Precede Life Term in Dawson
Deaths, BALT. SUN, Aug. 28, 2003, at IA.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Editorial, We All Share Responsibility for Failing the Dawson Family, BALT. SUN,
Feb. 19, 2005, at lB.
5. These policies include the subject of this article, Maryland EXILE, as well as other
state and local practices like Baltimore's "Blue Light Camera" project. See infra Parts I.B,
III.C.
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and work with authorities.6 Instead, a code of silence has increased in
strength in poor Baltimore neighborhoods, adopted in large measure
voluntarily by residents. 7 Marylanders living outside of these
neighborhoods have been eager consumers of dramatic crime and
punishment stories from Baltimore,8 but have not galvanized any
political will to compel positive changes.
The severe troubles in Baltimore must be addressed
immediately, and government must begin the process. While crime is a
terrible problem, a more fundamental failing lies in the breakdown of
trust between residents and authorities. The tough tactics of law
enforcement, combined with the short shrift poor Baltimore
neighborhoods receive in other areas of public services, are eroding
the faith of city residents in the government and the larger society.
This erosion of faith causes residents of particular Baltimore
neighborhoods to turn inward, to sever ties of cooperation and identity
with other communities, and to consider themselves to be apart from
their fellow citizens of Maryland and the rest of the United States-in
part because they are viewed as different by their government and the
majority society. This action-and-reaction represents a weakening of
the "social contract," an invention of political philosophers that had a
particularly important influence on the formation of American
governments and upon their reform and evolution. Government
authorities generally, and law enforcement specifically, can begin the
process of changing these circumstances, and fixing the rent in the
social contract, by altering policies and considering the interests of the
residents of inner city Baltimore when they craft initiatives to deter
and punish crime.
I. THE FRONT LINES OF BALTIMORE: STOP SNITCHING AND MARYLAND
EXILE
Two programs are underway in Baltimore, each with a public
messaging component and active policies that impact residents and the
functioning of criminal law processes. One arises from the community
itself and the other from law enforcement. They appear to be in direct
conflict, but both may contribute to eroding the covenant between
6. Greg Hanscom, Raising Oliver, URBANITE, May 2008, at 58.
7. Gregory Kane, Fighting the Code of Street Silence, BALT. SUN, Feb. 6, 2008, at IB;
Julie Bykowicz, Fighting the Code of Street Silence Justice, BALT. SUN, Oct. 28, 2007, at IA.
8. See, e.g., Devin Gordon, Good Mourning, Baltimore, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 2008;
Raymond A. Schroth, "The Wire" Depicts a Community on the Brink, NAT'L CATH. REP.,
Mar. 7, 2008.
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residents of poor communities in Baltimore and the majority society.
This section describes the "Stop Snitching mindset" and Maryland
EXILE, two engines of the breakdown of the social contract, as well as
defining and delimiting them in ways that help with analysis of their
impact.
A. Stop Snitching
Stop Snitching is the title of a DVD released by a Baltimore
filmmaker named Rodney Bethea in 2004.9 Popular for months in poor
Baltimore neighborhoods as an "underground" work, the DVD came
to broader light when Baltimore Police seized a large cache of the
videos and began using them to investigate crime and arrest suspected
criminals.' 0 The video shows diatribes by various Baltimore residents
against police informers, mostly individuals who "cut deals" with
police and prosecutors to testify in exchange for lesser punishment for
their own crimes.' The video mentions by name specific individuals
accused of "snitching" along with thinly-veiled threats regarding what
the speakers believe such "rats" deserve. The video also shows drug
use and displays of material wealth by the anti-snitching
proclaimants.
Bethea, who is releasing a second snitching video in 2008,
asserts that his goal in making the DVD was to reveal the desPeration
and degradation experienced by people living in urban slums.' He has
argued in more recent months that his various productions, through his
company Urly Media, serve as a call to action to all citizens to address
the systemic social problems that lead young people, particularly
African American y'outh, into lives of crime and other dangerous and
antisocial conduct. Law enforcement, public officials, and the media
9. DVD: 2004 Stop Snitching (Urly Media 2004).
10. Ryan Davis, Homemade DVDs about Informing Give Police Clues, BALT. SUN, Dec.
4, 2004, at IA.
11. DVD: 2004 Stop Snitching, supra note 9. For example, in one segment of the video,
young men repeatedly say "do your time" and declare that persons arrested for a crime should
accept the full sentence they would receive from a conviction rather than take a lesser term of
incarceration for cooperating with police and prosecutors. Id.
12. Id.
13. Gregory Kane, "Stop Snitching" Video Betrays a Muddled Criminal Mentality,
BALT. SuN, Dec. 8, 2004, at 1B.
14. Julie Bykowicz, Producer Says Education, Not Intimidation, Is Sequel's Focus,
BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 2007, at lB.
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largely have concluded that the video is a paean to witness
intimidation. 1
The larger "Stop Snitching" phenomenon, however, could also
consist of a disorganized social movement of resistance to and dissent
from current law enforcement practices. Certainly, any "movement"
activity that involves actual witness intimidation (and there may be a
good deal of this) is nothing but individual and organized criminal
conduct. 16 There is strong evidence, however, that the Stop Snitching
message has galvanized a general attitude of distrust of government
and police into a pervasive and voluntary refusal to participate with
law enforcement under any circumstances. 17 In a 60 Minutes segment
in 2007, journalist Anderson Cooper summed up this change by stating
that "'Stop snitching' once meant 'don't tell on others if you are
caught committing a crime,' but it has come to mean something much
more dangerous: don't cooperate with the police no matter who you
are."' 18 In this way, the Stop Snitching phenomenon represents a
community mindset of separation from, and rejection of, the majority
society and a view that government authorities are pitted against
particular communities, not working for them.
This paper focuses on this manifestation of Stop Snitching as a
rejection both of the social contract and of sovereign authority. It will
not, except as an ancillary matter, address actual witness intimidation.
Instead, for the purposes of examining Stop Snitching's effect on the
legitimacy of current positive law and law enforcement policy, this
paper assumes, based on consistent empirical evidence,' 9 that an
informal anti-majoritarian, anti-government policy is real and
widespread in poor communities in Baltimore. In examining Stop
Snitching, therefore, this paper focuses on the rejection of the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system and law enforcement by
individuals who have not actually committed a crime.
20
15. See, e.g., Editorial, Witness Intimidation, BALT. SUN, Dec. 9, 2004, at 26A; Julie
Bykowicz, Silence Still Stifles Justice, BALT. SUN, Oct. 28, 2007, at IA..
16. See Matthew Dolan, Inquiry Targets Md. Gang, BALT. SUN, Feb. 26, 2008, at IA.
17. Kane, supra note 7, at I B; Bykowicz, supra note 15.
18. 60 Minutes: Stop Snitching (CBS television broadcast Apr. 22, 2007).
19. See Kane, supra note 7; Brent Jones, Speakers at Forum Say One Segment of Society
Shouldn't Be Singled Out, BALT. SN, Feb. 1, 2008, at lB.
20. See infra Part III.D.
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B. Maryland EXILE
Maryland EXILE is a federal-state partnership to aggressively
pursue the perpetrators of gun crimes in particular areas of the state,
primarily Baltimore.21 The program focuses on investigating and
prosecuting felons who carry, or commit further crimes with,
22firearms. EXILE includes a high profile media and marketing
campaign to "warn felons" that they will be pursued and jailed for any
transgressions.
23
U.S. Attorney Rod Rosenstein launched Maryland EXILE in
2005, borrowing a popular and successful project framework from
Richmond, Virginia. The original EXILE concept from Richmond has
been copied frequently nationwide. 24 Through EXILE, federal, state,
and local law enforcement combine efforts, funding, and manpower to
focus on eradicating gun violence. 25 The core policy of EXILE is to
shift prosecution of gun crime offenders to federal court where (i) they
face tougher penalties; (ii) juries are drawn from a statewide rather
than local pool; and (iii) convicted defendants can be incarcerated in a
federal prison outside of Maryland.26 Secondarily, state prosecutors
use EXILE to compel defendants into pleading guilty in state court,
under the threat that the case will transfer to federal court otherwise.27
Through the program, state and federal law enforcement also expressly
target both gangs and individuals deemed "violent repeat offenders,"
conducting additional investigations and working "proactively ... to
21. United States Attorney, District of Maryland, Maryland EXILE: Gun Crime=Jail
Time, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/md/Exile/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter
Gun Crime=Jail Time].
22. Id.
23. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, BALTIMORE EXILE:
A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE 14 (2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/md/Exile/files/Baltimore%20EXILE%20strategy%20final.2006.02
.15.pdf [hereinafter BALTIMORE EXILE: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY].
24. Doug Donovan & Matthew Dolan, Baltimore to Help Fund Federal Prosecution of
Gun Crimes, BALT. SUN, Sept. 4, 2004, at 3A; see also Department of Criminal Justice
Services, Virginia Exile, http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/exile/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
25. See Gun Crime=Jail Time, supra note 21.
26. See BALTIMORE EXILE: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 23, at 1-2;
Matthew Dolan, Rise in Gun Prosecutions Projected, BALT. SUN, June 1, 2006, at 5B.
27. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, VIOLENT
CRIME PROGRAM: 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 VIOLENT CRIME
PROGRAM] (describing the use of "FLIP" letters that inform state defendants that the USAO
intends to prosecute); Matthew Dolan, City Gun-Crime Prosecutions Rose in '06, BALT. SUN,
Jan. 25, 2007, at 2B.
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devise strategies for getting them off the streets as quickly and
effectively as possible."
EXILE also includes a well-funded media and "public
awareness" component. 29  The United States Attorney's Office
(USAO) for the District of Maryland described these efforts in a
strategy whitepaper for the entire EXILE program in Baltimore:
A key component of Baltimore EXILE will be an
aggressive media/public relations campaign to send a
message to criminals and to the broader community that
any felon who carries a gun in Baltimore is going to
jail-that criminals will do hard time for gun crime.
The campaign will be designed to alert offenders to the
crackdown on gun crime and to energize the
community to support law enforcement efforts and, in
particular, their local police.
30
To date, the USAO has funded about thirty billboard
advertisements, most of which appear in and around poor
neighborhoods in Baltimore.31 These giant advertisements single out
and name specific criminals caught and prosecuted under EXILE. The
boards have garnered a lot of attention because the campaign appears
to mock and humiliate the convicted individuals alongside the more
general message that felons who carry guns will face tough penalties. 32
In addition to billboards, the USAO has funded similar advertisements
on radio, TV, and MTA buses.
33
28. BALTIMORE EXILE: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 23, at 8.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
31. Paul Mark Sandler, Commentary: Raising the Bar, DAILY REC. (Baltimore, Md.),
June 15, 2007; Luke Broadwater, Billboards Take Aim at High-Profile Criminals, THE
EXAMINER (Baltimore, Md.), March 7, 2007.
32. Laura Vozzella, Come See the Seahorses, but Check Your Guns, BALT. SUN, May
30, 2007, at 2B. Some examples of current billboard slogans include the following: "Solothal
'Itchy Man' Thomas got life in prison for carrying a gun. Wonder what his new nickname
is?;" "Wallace Allen got [nineteen] years in federal prison for carrying a gun. We hear Indiana
is nice this time of year;" and "Raeshio 'Goodie' Rice got [twenty-seven] years in federal
prison for carrying a gun. Anyone need a used Bentley?" Id.
33. Press Release, United States Attorney Office, District of Maryland, Dramatic
Maryland EXILE Television Commercial Targets Criminals Who Carry Guns (Jan. 10, 2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/md/index.html (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink;
then follow "2007 Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Dramatic Maryland Exile
Television Commercial Targets Criminals Who Carry Guns" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 17,
2008). The USAO described one television ad as follows:
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Maryland EXILE began in Baltimore and expanded to just two
other reions of Maryland-Prince George's and Wicomico
counties. 3  In 2007, nearly two hundred Baltimore residents were
prosecuted federally under EXILE and approximately another thirty
pleaded guilty to state charges rather than face a federal criminal
indictment. 35 To date, the majority of funds for marketing and public
outreach efforts have been spent in Baltimore.36
Despite its popularity with law enforcement, many critics have
assailed Project EXILE, in Maryland and elsewhere. 37 Among other
things, they aver that the programs unfairly target poor communities of
color and further isolate such communities from the mainstream.
38
Some legal critics assert that on their face, Project EXILE programs
violate equal protection.
39
II. ANGLO-SAXON SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY: HOBBES & LOCKE
American democracy developed, in large measure, under the
40political philosophy of the social contract. The theory guided the
drafters of our federal Constitution and continues to shape our legal
understandings of sovereignty and the limits of the law.4' The two
primary Anglo-Saxon sources for the theory are Thomas Hobbes'
The commercial opens with a young man watching television when his cell phone rings. After
answering the telephone, he reaches for a gun. As he touches the gun, the man suddenly finds
himself in a prison cell, with the door slamming shut. The voice-over then recites the names
and sentences of three Baltimore criminals who were sentenced to lengthy federal sentences
over the past year.
Id.
34. See Gun Crime=Jail Time, supra note 21.
35. Brent Jones, Increase in Gun Charges, Pleas Under Baltimore EXILE Lauded,
BALT. SUN, Feb. 21, 2008, at 6B.
36. Luke Broadwater, Billboards Take Aim at High-Profile Criminals, THE EXAMINER
(Baltimore, Md.), Mar. 7, 2007.
37. See, e.g., Tom Campbell, Bull's Eye or Wasted Shots? Federal Judges Not Among
Gun Program's Supporters, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 22, 1999, at Al; Daniel C. Richman,
"Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV.
369, 373, 382, 397 (2001); Chris Osher, Federal Agents, Prosecutors Targeting Guns, PITT.
TRIB. REV., Apr. 25, 2005.
38. Campbell supra note 37, at Al; Osher, supra note 37.
39. Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program
Targets Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 317-
339 (2007).
40. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 58-59 (Harv. Univ. Press 1968) (1967).
41. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 692-93 (1968) (arguing with Abe Fortas'
assertions on the Fifth Amendment through the lens of John Locke's social contract).
2008]
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Leviathan (1651) and John Locke's Two Treatises of Government
(1689).42 Locke's work played the larger role in the conception and
advancement of the United States Constitution and individual state
constitutions.4
While the two works (and writers) share many core ideas, they
depart from one another in significant ways. Social contract theory
generally provides a useful framework for evaluating the legitimacy of
both individual and state action. It has significant shortcomings,
however, particularly in an area cogent to this examination: the notion
of individual consent to a social contract." This section begins by
outlining the basics of social contract theory. It then presents core
differences between Locke and Hobbes important to the specific
conflict in Baltimore and examines problems raised by notions of
consent to a social contract. Finally, this section presents a practical
illustration of social contract theory at work in the legal system, as
well as the rejection of covenant obligations, in the form of jury
service and jury nullification. All these considerations will frame later
analysis of the impact of Stop Snitching and EXILE on communities
in Baltimore.
A. The Foundations of Social Contract Theory
Hobbes and Locke shared a similar core idea for why humans
band together into societies and create political bodies. In a state of
nature, where no political entities exist, persons have the utmost
liberty.45 Threats abound, however, and life lacks consistency of
justice between humans because each individual is an equal judge and
equal enforcer of her view of right and wrong.46 Natural laws exist,
universal truths about what conduct is acceptable and what is not, but
determination of violations and discretion to punish remain vested in
each individual.47 In order to maximize peace and prosperity, and to
42. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Flathman & David Johnston
eds., W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1997) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press
2003) (1690).
43. BAILYN supra, note 40, at 27-29, 55-59 (noting the pervasive influence of Locke on
the colonists and "founding fathers" as well as the equally widespread criticism of Hobbes'
stance).
44. See, e.g., Edward A. Harris, From Social Contract to Hypothetical Agreement:
Consent and the Obligation to Obey the Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 651, 673 (1992).
45. HOBBES supra note 42, at 68-69; LOCKE, supra note 42, at § 4.
46. HOBBES supra note 42, at 68-69; LOCKE supra note 42, at § 13.
47. HOBBES supra note 42, at 72; LOCKE supra note 42, at § 7.
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stave off the inevitable misjudgments arising from each person sitting
as judge and executioner, persons "covenant" to join together in
society and sacrifice some of their natural liberty to a commonwealth
or other sovereign government.48 Most importantly, parties to this
social contract cede individual rights (to stand as judge and punisher)
to an acknowledged authority that can establish positive law and
enforce it.49 Parties to the covenant also agree to abide by the laws
created by the sovereign authority, or face sanction.50 The theory seeks
to explain both (i) why persons would sacrifice complete liberty and
(ii) the legitimate bases for sovereign authority over individuals.
B. Important Divergences Between Hobbes and Locke
The ideas of the great British contractarians, however, do not
align fully. There are two closely-related areas of difference between
Hobbes and Locke cogent to the analysis in this paper. First, the two
philosophers envision life outside of the social contract in ways that
reveal subtle, but important differences in their overall conceptions of
liberty and sovereign power. Secondly, their address of the breakdown
of an existing social contract diverges quite clearly and suggests a
sharp contrast in how to value individual liberty and the integrity of
the state. The differences illustrate limitations and dangers in the
remedy sought through EXILE and suggest that a more Lockean view
might generate more effective solutions to the problem of community
rejection of criminal law and responsibility.
1. Man in the State of Nature: Two Views
Locke described the state of nature in neutral, if not affirmative
terms. 51 He lauded the liberty individuals experience in such a
52condition. He expressly described the state of war between persons
as different and separate from the state of nature. 53 Locke asserted that
humans form political bodies through a social contract to combat the
three "inconveniences" that arise among them in the state of nature.
5 4
48. HOBBES supra note 42, at 95; LOCKE supra note 42, at § 87.
49. HOBBES supra note 42, at 96-98; LOCKE supra note 42, at § 134.
50. HOBBES supra note 42, at 96-98; LOCKE supra note 42, at § 129-30.
51. LOCKE supra note 42, at § 4.
52. Id.
53. Id. at § 19.
54. Id. at §§ 124-26. Clearly, the word "inconvenience" in Locke's work is not wholly
synonymous with the same word in contemporary usage. It still, however, strikes the reader as
a deliberate and curious choice, particularly when compared to Hobbes' view of the state of
nature. Locke's "inconveniences" are (i) the unpredictable effects of personal bias in a world
20081 299
300 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 8:291
He indicated that these inconveniences tend to lead persons toward a
state of war-but he did so through the equivocating reverse-
suggestion that formation of a commonwealth staves off war because it
remedies the inconveniences.
55
Hobbes' view of the state of nature was wholly negative,
bordering on apocalyptic. 56 He asserted that the natural state is
equivalent to a state of continual war, with every person the enemy of
every other person. 57 In the state of nature, individuals experience ever
present fear and threat of violence. Hobbes summed up his view of
pre-contract existence with this famous quote: "And the life of man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short., 58 Hobbes attributed this
endemic proclivity for violence and strife to three factors inherent to
the makeup of humans: competiveness, diffidence, and lust for glory.
59
Both writers urged that a social contract is necessary for the
safety and productivity of human beings. 60 Locke, however, appeared
to view the state of nature as noble and excellent for the degree to
which it afforded individuals the utmost liberty; his description of the
need for social bonds, while far from making them sound like a
"necessary evil," evokes in the reader a hint of wistful loss and
concession to efficiency and safety.6 1 Hobbes, on the other hand,
viewed the social contract as a saving grace, an absolute necessity to
stave off unbridled striving, violence, and terror.62 He did not laud
individual liberty so much as he viewed the individual as unable to
muster and sustain the power to repel challenges. 63 In his conception,
the grant of authority to a sovereign through covenant provides
humans something more fundamental than a greater chance at
happiness; in most cases, it ensures persons their very lives.
64
where all individuals stand as equal judge of others; (ii) the lack of a known and neutral
decision maker; and (iii) the lack of reliable power to enforce even a just sentence for
wrongdoing. Id.
55. Id. at § 21.
56. HOBBESsupra note 42, at 68-71.
57. Id. at 70.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. HOBBES supra note 42, at 95; LOCKE supra note 42, at § 87.
61. LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 4, 19, 124-26.
62. HOBBES supra note 42, at 68-72.
63. Id.
64. HOBBES supra note 42, at 70.
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2. Breakdown in the Social Contract: Two Views
In the chapter on "Dissolution of Government," 65 Locke
focused first and foremost on the uses and boundaries of government
authority.66 He asserted that a government is different from the society
persons create through a social contract. 67 Government, to remain
legitimate, must act according to the trust vested in it by society. 68 It
cannot harm property or overly infringe liberties properly retained by
individuals. 69 Breach by state actors of the trust placed in government
threatens the social contract because it can represent a state of war
against the people-one that might compel them to reclaim their full
liberty.70 Locke certainly decried rebellion by persons who merely
seek power or who undermine government authority without just proof
of a serious and continual breach of trust with society.71 His primary
concern, however, rested on whether the authority that arises out of the
social contract properly has honored and preserved the liberty and
72property of the covenantors. When disputes arise, he suggested that
the will of the people should prevail over the power they have placed
in a sovereign. These conclusions appear consonant with Locke's
reverence for individual liberty revealed in his description of the state
of nature.74 They also should sound familiar to any student of
American history.
Hobbes' view of the dissolving social contract developed from
his assertions that individual liberty is subject to the unlimited
authority of the sovereign.76 Obligation to the sovereign continues so
long as that power offers persons protection. 77 In Hobbes' conception,
commonwealths weaken and the bonds of the social contract dissolve
65. LOCKE supra note 42, §§ 221-243.
66. Id. at §§ 221-28.
67. Id. at § 211.
68. Id. at §§ 131, 221-22.
69. Id.
70. Id. at § 222.
71. Id. at §§ 227-28.
72. Id. at § 221-22.
73. Id. at § 242.
74. Id. at § 4.
75. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776); THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
76. HOBBES supra note 24, at 117 ("The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in
those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath prtermitted .... nothing
the Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be
called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth
.... '1).
77. Id. at 121.
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from the promulgation of "seditious doctrines"; 7s over-reliance on the
individual conscience; 79 subjection of the sovereign to civil laws and
other forms of dividing or divesting sovereign power;80  and
aggrandizement or over-enrichment of certain individuals.8 1 Lastly,
and perhaps most distinctly from Locke, Hobbes spotted danger in
"the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power" or the ability of
individuals to protest for greater liberty against the appointed
sovereign in ways that would divest its authority.82 In this way,
Hobbes directed his reverence toward the sovereign authority created
by the social contract, justified by the protection it creates for
covenantors. He viewed challenges to that sovereignty as threats to
restore a state of nature and plunge humans back into continual war.83
Only when the sovereign orders a subject to harm himself, or
unjustifiably to submit to physical harm by others, can an individual
take liberty to disobey in self-preservation. 84 Under Hobbes' view, the
most important goal of the social contract is to create and maintain
safety, thus staving off the instability and violence guaranteed outside
of the commonwealth.85
Once again, both philosophers conceive of a social contract as
a way to promote stability between people and consistency in
individual affairs.8 6 The most important components and values of the
social contract, however, differ significantly in each conception. Locke
always appeared to have his eye on maximizing personal liberty within
the necessary boundaries of the social contract and the political
authority it creates. 87 He obliquely urged a kind of tension between
government authority and individual liberty to ensure a proper balance.
78. Id. at 163.
79. Id. at 163-64.
80. Id. at 164-68.
81. Id. at 168.
82. Id. at 169. Hobbes appeared to qualify this assertion by stating that the problematical
disputes were those led by "pretenders to Politicall [sic] Prudence," whom he described in
various insulting terms. There is no suggestion, however, that any non-loathsome, non-
pretender could raise a legitimate challenge to the exercise of sovereign power. Id.
83. Id. at 163-68.
84. Id. at 119.
85. Richard Flathman, a preeminent Hobbes scholar (and resident of Baltimore,
ironically), dismisses this kind of reading of Leviathan as overly-simplistic. RICHARD E.
FLATHMAN, Of Making and Unmaking, THOMAS HOBBES: SKEPTICISM, INDIVIDUALITY, AND
CHASTENED POLITICS 1-9 (1993). He asserted that a deeper reading reveals that Hobbes never
expected that any sovereign could exercise total control or expect full fealty from his subjects,
thus ensuring the kind of positive tension that ensures more individual liberty. Id.
86. HOBBES supra note 42, at 95; LOCKE, supra note 42, at § 87.
87. LOCKE supra note 42, at §§ 221-22.
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Hobbes focused instead on maximizing safety and stability by
ensuring the strength and integrity of the sovereign power. He
suggested that the decision to contract was of utmost consequence and
finality because creation of a sovereign authority vested that person or
entity with substantial and almost unassailable power.89 The acts of
Hobbes' sovereign are the acts of the parties to the contract so long as
those parties are protected from violence within and without society,
so little "tension" can exist between individual subjects and agents of
the commonwealth. 90
C. Creation of the Social Contract and Adherence to Its
Consequences: Consent
One final aspect of social contract theory important to
contemporary issues in Baltimore is the question of how individual
persons "join" such a covenant. A young woman born in the poor
west-side neighborhood of Sandtown-Winchester had little choice of
whether or not she "joined" the municipality of Baltimore, and her
status as a citizen of Maryland and the United States was automatically
granted to her. How is she subject to the laws of these sovereigns if
she did not elect to participate in the social contract? Can it merely be
thrust upon her? Individual consent poses a problem for contractarians,
one that neither Hobbes nor Locke answered sufficiently.
Contemporary scholars similarly have struggled with these questions.
Locke and Hobbes agreed that consent to a social contract can
be express or implied. 91 Implied consent is most common, since very
few people take a formal, express oath to forego a portion of their
natural liberty and to comport with civil laws.92 Though they differ in
some details, both philosophers suggested that a person impliedly
consents to the social contract underlying a commonwealth by residing
there and receiving the benefits of such residence.
93
88. HOBBES supra note 42, at 117-21.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 117.
91. HOBBES supra note 42, at 73-75; LOCKE supra note 42, at §§ 119-20.
92. In the United States, most forms of elected or appointed government office do
require a formal oath to uphold the law. Legal aliens who apply for and receive citizenship
likewise must take an oath.
93. See, e.g., LOCKE supra note 42, at 119 ("[E]very man, that hath possession, or
enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit
consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such
enjoyment, as any one under it .... ").
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Modem scholars have wrestled with this notion of consent,
mostly failing to reach satisfactory conclusions. Some suggest that
mere residence represents consent and urge a positive formalization of
the fact in legal doctrine.94 Others aver that residence alone should
comprise no more than evidence of consent and then only when the
individual has a genuine choice to continue her residence and is free to
leave at will. 9  Another group rejects residence altogether as
constituting an act of consent.
Another consent theory posits, similarly, that the acceptance of
benefits provided by the state creates consent to the social contract and
agreement to comport with the positive law of the commonwealth. 97 A
host of circumstances can comprise acceptance of benefits, including
exploiting economic opportunities afforded by general peace and
making use of public infrastructure like highways up to more
affirmative acceptance of services like public education or food
stamps. As with residence, however, some writers have questioned
whether consent arises from benefits that an individual receives
regardless of choice. 98 Similarly, these critics question whether it is
appropriate or legally sound to argue that acceptance of a single
sought-after benefit obligates a person to comply with each and every
law asserted by a sovereign government.
99
Lastly, some scholars abandon the effort of pointing to
affirmative individual actions or conditions (like residence or the
acceptance of benefits) that create concrete consent and look instead to
a kind of hypothetical consent to political authority. 00 Hanna Pitkin's
view on this may be the most pragmatic and straightforward. She
asserted that obligation to participate in the social contract and to obey
positive law arises based on the "character of the government."'' 1 If a
government is good and just in the main-as opposed to tyrannical-
the individual must submit (or consent) because it is the kind of
94. Harry Beran, In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and
Authority, 87 ETHICS 260, 270 (1977).
95. MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP
28 (Harv. Univ. Press 1970).
96. Harris, supra note 44, at 662-63.
97. WALZER, supra note 95, at 28. Though separate from consent through mere
residence, this theory in fact more directly resembles Locke's assertion that "enjoyment" of
the fruits of the commonwealth stands as consent. Id.
98. Harris, supra note 44, at 664-65.
99. Id.
100. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17 (Harv. Univ. Press 1971) (1958).
101. Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent: Part H, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 39, 39 (1966).
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government to which a person ought to submit.' 0 2 This conception,
though broad, is objective. It shifts analysis from the conduct of the
individual to the justness (and thereby legitimacy) of the sovereign
body. Pitkin acknowledged that the decision of the individual or group
to reject consent raised problems and contradictions.' 0 3 She suggested
that proper resistance (or refusal of consent) could not be based on
thoughtless whimsy, but rather must rely on thoughtful and principled
consideration of the justness of the government and all the relevant
social circumstances that might, or might not, urge dissent. 1
04
The notion of consent is important to this paper because it
raises questions about whether a citizen has a moral or legal right to
dissent. Can individuals legitimately resist the legal mandates of a
sovereign power or the moral expectations of the sovereign and the
vast majority of citizens? Can individuals "revoke consent" under any
circumstances and effectively undermine the actions and positive law
of a sovereign power? These are frightening questions because they
introduce the idea generally that a person or a community could refuse
to participate in the larger society and declare themselves free of legal
obligations-a fact that would have unpredictable results for those
who do conform.
D. Illustration of the Social Contract and Rejection of Covenant
Obligations: Jury Nullification
The "average citizen" plays a direct role in formal legal process
in the United States through the institution of the jury. Individuals
have both legal and moral obligations to participate on a jury,10 5 to
decide the fate of an accused criminal or outcome of a civil dispute. In
criminal trials, juries (and by extension, average citizens) hold a
special place, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution:
unless the defendant waives his right, a jury is the only authority that
can determine guilt.'0 6 Jury service may represent one of the most
important and most direct exercises of social contract obligations. A
long and controversial history of jury nullification exists in America,
102. Id.
103. Id. at 51-52 ("What needs to be said seems to be this: the decision both is and is not
up to each individual.").
104. Id. at 44, 52.
105. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., §§ 8-102, 8-503, 8-504 (West 2007)
(outlining legal duties to serve on juries and specific prohibitions regarding avoidance of
service).
106. U.S. CONST., amend VI.
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however. 107 Nullification is a practice where juries acquit defendants
who by all accounts should have been found guilty. This presents an
intriguing example of persons rejecting their obligations to a
commonwealth and acting from individual conscience in contravention
of positive law.
Criminal juries are charged with the duty of applying the law,
as defined by the judge, to the facts. 108 There is no sanction, however,
for failing to do so, absent proof of bribery or other fraud. And
regardless of whether they "got it right," if a jury acquits a criminal
defendant, that decision cannot be overturned-not by the trial judge
or on appeal. 10 9 In other words, a jury can find a defendant not guilty
even when the facts and law clearly suggest that he is guilty, and this
determination cannot be challenged. Accordingly, in the United States,
there is a legal and moral obligation to serve on juries, but only a
moral duty to apply the law "correctly" to the facts in a criminal case.
Some individuals or entire juries take it upon themselves to make a
different moral choice at times and to acquit even when the command
of their sovereign would suggest otherwise. They can do so for a
variety of reasons-some that could be read as a higher form of justice
and some not. 110
The practice of nullification appears to represent a rift in jury
members' individual surrender to the social contract and agreement to
comport with the law. Even though a juror is not required by law to
render a "legal" verdict, she is expected, under a Hobbesean or
Lockean view, to follow and support positive law."' It is possible to
argue that, because juries act as officials of the court, they receive a
measure of direct sovereign power, pennitting them to make a decision
in the interests of justice rather than merely as an application of
107. See Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 St. Tr. 675 (1735); People v. Croswell, 3 Johns.
Cas. 336 (N.Y. 1804).
108. MORTIMER KADISH & SANFORD KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 50 (Stan. Univ.
Press 1973) (quoting United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1969) ("We must
hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in
criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them
to be from the evidence.")).
109. Id.
110. Classic conditions for jury nullification might occur when a woman kills her partner
after suffering years of physical abuse from him. If the jurisdiction does not permit a "battered
woman syndrome" defense and the circumstances do not suggest a viable self-defense
argument because the woman killed well-after a beating and at a time when she could have
fled, the defendant may face an open-and-shut homicide charge. A jury, however, might acquit
her if members found that she was justified in the killing regardless of what the judge outlined
as the applicable legal doctrine. See, e.g., NORMAN FINKLE, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS'
NOTIONS OF THE LAW 228-34 (1995).
111. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 96-98; LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 129-30.
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positive law. 1 2 This view, however, may not comport with Anglo-
Saxon social contract theory. Under Hobbes' and Locke's shared view,
persons surrender their natural role as individual "deciders" and must
defer to the positive law enacted by the sovereign they have
empowered. 113 A president or legislator may not act outside the law
merely because she is an officer of the sovereign, though she may
define, interpret, or change the law. Jurors can apply-perhaps even
interpret-the law; but they are not empowered to define or change it,
and they certainly cannot act outside of it.
Not surprisingly, views on the legitimacy of nullification fall
along a spectrum. Some commentators, like Robert Bork, assert that
jury nullification is a wholly illegitimate practice. 114 Others, like
Mortimer and Sanford Kadish, suggest that jury nullification is legal,
moral, and necessary when-but only when-justice clearly requires
it."' Still others, like Paul Butler, urge that large scale social
injustices, like racism and racially-based over-prosecution and
incarceration, demand a radical response through systematic jury
nullification for some criminal defendants until the law and law
enforcement are reformed." 6
Jury nullification is useful to the examination of EXILE and
Stop Snitching because it stands as an example of the judgment of a
group of individuals, working within the legal process, who act
contrary to general legal and moral expectations and whose actions
may have moral legitimacy above the positive law. In short, a jury that
acquits a "technically guilty" defendant likely has broken or
disregarded the social contract, but may be justified in so doing.
III. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN BALTIMORE: WHO Is IN BREACH?
Many of the commonplace obligations and expectations of a
social contract appear terribly broken in certain Baltimore
communities. This section attempts to discover what that means, but
not in terms of distilling and weighing a list of specific causes like
112. KADISH, supra note 108, at 46, 56-58.
113. See supra Part II.A.
114. Robert Bork, Thomas Morefor Our Season, 94 FIRST THINGS 17, 17-21 (1999).
115. KADISH, supra note 108, at 56-66. See also Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and
Morality-Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REv. 177, 229-30 (1981).
116. See generally Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 677-725, 679 (1995) (asserting that black juries
have a moral responsibility to nullify prosecutions of some black offenders because arrest and
prosecution practices reflect endemic racial bias and because black communities are "better
off when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the community rather than go to prison.").
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addiction, racism, or poverty (though these will appear in the inquiry).
Instead, the analysis will focus on who is most responsible for the
breakdown of the covenant and why certain approaches to covenant
obligations in these communities result in its overall weakening. There
are three entities or groups to examine: persons in Baltimore who
commit acts deemed criminal under state or federal law; government
authorities that develop and implement aggressive crime fighting and
messaging programs like EXILE; and community members who freely
participate in the Stop Snitching "policy" (or similar rejections of law
enforcement) and spread its message. In most respects, the last group
is the most important. The community can enhance or undermine the
authority of law enforcement and can condemn or condone the actions
of individual community members even if they violate positive law. 
117
Different, but related, questions attach to each group. For the
criminal actors, this article will examine whether they bear criminal or
moral responsibility for their illegal conduct in light of possible
community rejection of criminal laws and their enforcement. For law
enforcement and the executive, legislative, and judicial officers who
guide and support them, the inquiry focuses on whether they are
making proper use of their authority under the social contract, or
whether EXILE and like approaches represent a breach of trust under a
Hobbesean or Lockean viewpoint. Further, even if legitimate, can
EXILE stand as an effective law enforcement mechanism? For
community members who are not criminal actors, the questions are
whether they have breached the social contract and whether they are
morally blameworthy for refusing to cooperate with authorities and for
rejecting government power either overtly or internally. Again, the
differences between Hobbes' and Locke's views of the social contract
will impact the analysis.
A. An Introduction: The Communities at Issue Are Geographically
Discrete and That Matters
The fact that these programs focus on physically discrete and
distinct areas-on particular neighborhoods within Baltimore-holds
great significance for the social contract calculus. Jane Jacobs noted
insightfully in The Death and Life of Great American Cities that an
effective law enforcement function begins at the neighborhood level
with informal, but consistent and strong, checks on behavior and
117. Cf Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 150 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
HENRY FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 196, 209 (1967) (asserting that criminal law and its penalties
reflect the moral condemnation of the community).
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policing of property by neighbors rather than officers.118 In this
conception, formal law enforcement processes grow out of these
community efforts and partner with them. 1 9 Cops and courts "finish
the job" of apprehending, processing, and punishing more serious
wrongdoers; they take over when the conduct at issue is beyond the
safe scope of a neighbor's or shopkeeper's social enforcement
power. 120 The more common, day-to-day law enforcement and keeping
of the peace, however, rest in the hands of community members who
know and respect the law and who work together to maintain it. 
121
Jacobs' empirical view of law-in-neighborhoods 122 comports
with the concept of the social contract where each individual compacts
with her fellows to participate in a safe and productive commonwealth,
pledges fealty to the sovereign, and agrees to follow the law. 123
Watching out for one's neighbor is simply the most basic and efficient
way of living up to these obligations. Thus, the neighborhood can be a
clear -manifestation of, and even enhancement to, an existing social
contract.124 This tended to be the case in my former Baltimore
neighborhood of Remington.125 During the five years I resided there,
people surveilled strangers and informed their neighbors of odd
activity around their properties or on the streets. Individual residents
reported crime, and in some cases, foiled crime themselves before
calling the police. 126 Though racially and socio-economically diverse
118. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 40, 45-47 (Modem
Library Ed. 1993).
119. Cf id. at 48-49, 147-49. See also Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action,
and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1513, 1524-25 (2002).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra Part 1I.A.
124. I would suggest that municipal regulations are a larger, more formalized, and more
artificial version of the "neighborhood enhancement" of the larger social contract. A
municipal body is not a sovereign power, so it cannot demand that residents submit any of
their personal authority or autonomy to it under a Hobbesean or Lockean political framework.
Yet, municipal bodies do incorporate, do pass and enforce laws (so long as they align with the
laws of the sovereign power) that reflect the needs and values of that community. While it is
true that an individual in a neighborhood has free choice to participate or not participate in
informal, even unspoken, rules and regulations established by others on the street, while that
individual is legally compelled to follow "legal" rules set by his municipality, that person still
is not a "subject" of either his neighborhood or his town the way he is a legal subject to his
sovereign or sovereigns.
125. Remington is a neighborhood in the north central section of Baltimore, just to the
southwest of Johns Hopkins University.
126. The first winter I lived in Remington, a neighbor a block from my house spotted
some kids stealing packages left on porches by delivery companies and the postal service. This
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(and from my perspective, not notably friendly or cohesive), my comer
of Remington appeared to function as an informal unit within the
sovereign commonwealth of Maryland. While some residents
grumbled about municipal inefficiency or the noise created by police
helicopters late at night, everyone worked with law enforcement and
city officials to address problems and keep individuals within the
reasonable bounds of the law. Likewise, city, state, and federal law
enforcement did not appear to make any special efforts in Remington,
aside from the kinds of youth-oriented programming they offer
citywide. The two halves of the equation, residents and law
enforcement, worked together in this neighborhood with minimal
friction because everyone operated from the same set of rules.
Unfortunately, this may not be how the equation operates in
other parts of Baltimore. Despite its pop-cultural currency
elsewhere, 127 Stop Snitching is a phenomenon of demographically and
geographically discrete communities: neighborhoods within Baltimore
populated predominately by poor, African-American residents.1
28
These are the same communities where violent crime rates are the
highest in the state.' 29 If the message of Stop Snitching in fact causes
residents voluntarily to reject recourse to the police, these communities
are deliberately, if not always consciously, severing the kind of
informal cooperative ties that exist in other areas of the city between
residents and law enforcement. They are refusing to "locally ratify"
the larger social contract with their own enhanced version of it. This
suggests either that no social contract exists or that residents of these
neighborhoods operate under their own contract, wholly apart from
that shared by fellow Maryland residents. 130 At the same time, these
areas are plagued by chronic crime of a magnitude that individual
citizens could never deter themselves,' 31 even if that was their intent.
man yelled at the perpetrators, chased them, and recovered an armful of packages they
dropped as they ran.
127. See, e.g., David S. Bernstein, It's Gotta' Be the Shirts, BOSTON PHOENIX, Dec. 9,
2005
(http://www.bostonphoenix.comiboston/news-features/top/features/documents/0 13 3 92 8. asp)
DVD: 2006 The Game: Stop Snitchin' Stop Lyin' (Bungalo Records, Inc. 2006).
128. Julie Bykowicz, supra note 14, at 2B.
129. See BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOOD INDICATORS ALLIANCE, VITAL SIGNS IV 35 (2006)
[hereinafter VITAL SIGNS IV].
130. Cf Mat Edelson, Murder, Interrupted, URBANITE, May 2008, at 65, 65-69,
available at http://www.urbanitebaltimore.com/
sub.cfm?issuelD=60&sectionlD=4&articlelD=933 (describing community rejection of
established law enforcement practices and application by citizens of ad hoc rules to "right"
perceived wrongs).
131. VITAL SIGNS IV, supra note 129, at 35 (2006).
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These conclusions are actually quite chilling. If I were to walk
from my neighborhood to the north for a few minutes, I would enter a
new neighborhood (Roland Park), quite distinct from my own; and if I
were to walk from my neighborhood to the west for a few minutes, I
would again enter a third neighborhood (Greater Mondawmin),
distinct from mine and from the first neighborhood I visited. My
neighborhood and Roland Park, however, likely share a tendency
among residents to self-police and to work with law enforcement in
the "equation" of keeping the peace. Residents of Greater
Mondawmin, however, might manage their community quite
differently, conducting what local enforcement they could on their
own while avoiding interactions with police. Given that the violent
crime rate in Greater Mondawmin is more than twice that in
Remington and more than eight times that in Roland Park, 132 such a
state of affairs is clearly failing to meet the basic needs of community
safety, but it may exist and persist nonetheless.
On the law enforcement side, EXILE operates in a fashion that
is similarly out-of-synch with Jacobs' notion of community bonds and
official action. The program expressly targets discrete geographic
areas in Maryland, primarily Baltimore. 133 Within Baltimore, the
overwhelming majority of EXILE investigations and prosecutions,
meaning the overwhelming expenditures of financial resources and
manpower, take place in these same poor, black communities where
Stop Snitching.prevails. 134 While crime statistics certainly suggest that
these are the areas of highest need for law enforcement intervention,
this program appears to operate without the cooperation or sanction of
local residents. 35 It is a special action, applied to the community
rather than requested by it.
In this way, both (i) the implementation of EXILE-style
policing; and (ii) the fact of community disengagement from the
official channels of law enforcement serve to physically define and
"balkanize" particular neighborhoods within Baltimore and Maryland.
The communities that reject the resident-police participation common
132. Id. at 34-37 (2006).
133. See Gun Crime=Jail Time, supra note 21. See also BALTIMORE EXILE: A
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 23, at 1-3.
134. Jones, supra note 35.
135. Compare 2006 VIOLENT CRIME PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 1-6 (describing
investigations and prosecutions in Baltimore that occurred almost exclusively in poor
communities of color); Jeremy Kahn, Story of a Snitch, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2007, available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200704/stop-snitching (describing mostly poor,
minority neighborhoods in Baltimore where the Stop Snitching culture, along with witness
intimidation, have taken hold).
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to Remington are the same communities subject to the kind of law
enforcement action Remington rarely sees.
B. Blameworthiness of Criminal Actors in Baltimore
Do the battling messages of EXILE and Stop Snitching-and
the concomitant mistrust of law enforcement and the "get tough"
tactics of police-in any way reduce the culpability of persons in these
specific communities who commit crimes? I limit this inquiry to
violent and property crimes (such as murder, rape, assault, robbery,
and theft) and will not include drug crimes, which tend to raise a
whole additional set of inquiries and controversies.136 It appears that
regardless of any weakening of the social contract, those who commit
serious crimes still bear full culpability because the core moral
wrongness of their actions is not reduced or eliminated.
If a person commits a violent crime in Maryland, he has broken
the statutory law' 37 or established common law' 38 of the state. This law
and the punishments that accompany it represent, to a large degree, the
moral values of the majority in the state 13 9 and carry the authority of a
sovereign power. To contractarians, a breach of the established law
represents an offense against the sovereign and a breach of the
covenant between the criminal actor and his fellow citizens. 14 0 In
addition, Hobbes and Locke probably would argue that serious crimes
violate natural law, the universal directives and prohibitions that exist
between humans both outside and within a commonwealth. 141
136. 1 elected to limit the inquiry to these terms for a number of reasons. First, by
focusing on violent crimes or more serious property crimes, I keep the analysis within the
general realm of interest for EXILE enforcement. Secondly, if residents are deliberately
refusing to report violent crimes, this demonstrates the magnitude of their distrust for
sovereign powers. Lastly, the criminality of minor drug offenses and petty crimes may
fundamentally be in question in target communities.
It is true that prosecution of minor drug crimes and the inexplicably harsh punishments for
some of them likely contributes to community rejection of law enforcement methods. This
topic, however, involves its own complexities and has a rich body of scholarship around it.
See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted
Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2007).
137. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-203 (West 2007) (enumerating crime of
assault in the second degree).
138. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 737 A.2d 622, 635 (Md. 1999) (defining common law
crime of robbery).
139. Joshua Dressier, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the
Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1155, 1169 (1987).
140. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 96-98; LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 129-30.
141. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 72-73; LOCKE, supra note 42, at § 6.
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Person Y who commits an assault in Sandtown-Winchester has
broken the statutory law of Maryland. 142 He likewise has breached his
covenant with his fellow Maryland residents, to the degree that such a
covenant exists. 143 If we assume that the social contract providing for
the sovereignty of the State of Maryland has eroded in Sandtown-
Winchester, that it no longer exists between the residents of that
neighborhood and the rest of the state, then Y is not subject to contract
obligations and thus cannot breach them.144 We could argue then that
Y is subject to Maryland law and its coercive power only as a kind of
unwilling captive or detainee. He is not actually, legally responsible
for breaking the positive law if the social contract does not extend to
residents of his neighborhood.
Y is, however, responsible for breaching tenets of natural law
whether the social contract exists or not. 145 Y is morally blameworthy
for upsetting the peace and committing an act of violence against
another person.146 In short, Y committed a clear wrong. The difference
lies in how the wrong is defined and who can punish Y for it. If the
social contract in Sandtown-Winchester is dissolved, state officials
have no more authority than anyone else to define the crime of assault
and to punish Y for it. 147 The victim of the crime or a neighbor or
family member has just as much authority, outside of a valid social
contract, to declare Y a wrongdoer and to punish him. 1
48
Accordingly, even if law enforcement programs like EXILE
and community refusal to work with officers of the sovereign power
signaled a complete dissolution of the social contract, and poor
neighborhoods in Baltimore could be considered "positive law free
zones," the wrongfulness of serious criminal conduct is not lessened or
eliminated. The refusal of community members to report criminal
conduct does not reduce the blameworthiness of wrongdoers in
Sandtown-Winchester in a contractarian sense. 149 Practically speaking,
142. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-203 (West 2007).
143. See supra Part II.A (describing the duties shouldered by each individual living under
a functioning social contract).
144. See supra Part II.A (outlining the core theories of Hobbes and Locke regarding the
creation of a social contract and the relations between humans when no such contract exists).
145. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 72-73; LOCKE, supra note 42, at § 6.
146. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 72-73 (outlining the first "Fundamentall Law of
Nature"); LOCKE, supra note 42, at § 6 (enumerating natural laws that govern in the states of
nature and of social contract).
147. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 68-69; LocKE, supra note 42, at § 7.
148. Id.
149. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 68-69, 72; LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 7, 13 (establishing
that moral wrongs and crimes exist and that each individual has authority to judge and punish
conduct when no social contract exists).
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though, it does mean that persons like Y can commit criminal acts with
greater impunity.
As simplistic as this conclusion may seem, it is important to
establish. The erosion of the social contract does not eliminate
concepts of wrongdoing. Instead, it throws into question what
authority may define and punish wrongdoing and likely fuels further
disorder and crime.
C. The Exercise of Sovereign Authority in Baltimore: Proper or
Improper?
EXILE likely represents a threat to the social contract, as
opposed to an effective and appropriate law enforcement program.
State and federal authorities must implement programs and policies in
accordance with legislative, common, and constitutional law. Whether
authorities can enforce the law without the support of citizens is a far
more difficult question. "0 It raises an issue of social contract theory
where Hobbes and Locke likely disagree. 151 While the program
represents an appropriate exercise of power under a Hobbesean view,
Maryland EXILE appears to violate Lockean notions of the proper
balance between government authority and individual interests. As a
result, sovereign powers should evaluate whether these policies and
practices are appropriate, fair, and effective.
Maryland EXILE concentrates its human capital, money, and
coercive power on investigating and prosecuting wrongdoers who
primarily live in the poorest neighborhoods with the highest
concentrations of people of color in Baltimore. 152 Though Project
EXILE has not been challenged successfully on constitutional grounds
anywhere in the country, courts and scholars have expressed serious
concerns about how EXILE programs primarily target low-income
men of color from particular communities. 153 In addition to selective
federal prosecution, the program expressly seeks to identify,
investigate, and, whenever possible, remove individuals that officers
determine represent a high criminal threat-whether police have
150. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 44, at 656.
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See BALTIMORE EXILE: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 23, at 1-12;
Jones, supra note 35, at 6B. See also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
153. See United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311-312 (E.D. Va. 1999) (three
judge panel taking express notice that EXILE looks like it suffers from selective prosecution);
Gardner, supra note 39, at 305-07.
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evidence of immediate illegal conduct or not.' 54 This type of approach
raises fundamental due process concerns. "'
These aggressive tactics join with an equally aggressive
messaging component. The EXILE marketing campaign suggests that
state and federal authorities are watching these neighborhoods very
closely. 156 There is a "wanted poster" mentality to the general
messaging and advertisements. The official decrees suggest that those
bearing felony convictions, whether ex- or current-offenders, are on
the list; meanwhile, the target neighborhoods are home to the highest
percentage of ex-offenders in the state. 157 More strikingly, the
Maryland EXILE billboard campaign deliberately ridicules named
community members to their neighbors and friends-a provocative
choice even given the moral blameworthiness of individuals like
Solothal "Itchy Man" Thomas.
158
All this effort, coercive power, and negative messaging
targeted at very distinct communities can be viewed like a declaration
of war (in the contractarian sense) 159 by the majority society against
the poorest minority neighborhoods. Law enforcement persuasively
argues that they are declaring war on crime and focusing their efforts
154. BALTIMORE EXILE: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 23, at 8.
155. Cf City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (plurality opinion) (asserting
that the Constitution will not allow criminal law and processes to detain all possible offenders,
leaving the courts to sort out later who was correctly arrested).
156. See 2006 VIOLENT CRIME PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 34-35 (describing the public
relations component of Maryland EXILE).
157. See, e.g., Abell Foundation, Re-Entry Center, http://www.abell.org/programareas/
highlights/reentry.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008); Lionel Foster, Man of Conviction,
URBANITE, May 2008, at 52, 55, available at http://www.urbanitebaltimore.com/
sub.cfm?issuelD=60&sectionlD=4&articlelD=931 (stating that in 2001, fifty-nine percent of
inmates released from Maryland prisons came to Baltimore and that sixty percent of those
settled in just five zip codes within the city).
158. Solothal Thomas was a notorious Baltimore gangster, convicted in federal court in
2006 for murder and conspiracy. Press Release, United States Attorney Office, District of
Maryland, Solothal Thomas and Edward Countess Convicted in Murder-For-Hire Scheme
(Jul. 6, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/md/Public-Affairs/pressreleases/
press06a.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2008). His name appears prominently on an EXILE
billboard. 2006 VIOLENT CRIME PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 34-35.
159. The state of war plays a role in social contract theory in a number of contexts.
Hobbes and Locke each discussed the state of war outside the social contract where no
sovereign or positive law prevails. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 70; LOCKE, supra note 42, at §
19. Again, Hobbes saw the state of nature as equivalent to a state of war while Locke
separated the two states. See supra Part lI.B. In addition, Locke specifically discussed the idea
of a sovereign or government waging war against particular citizens or groups. LocKE, supra
note 42, at § 220-24. As discussed in supra Part II.A and just below, Locke asserted that any
fundamental breach of the trust placed in the sovereign could comprise an act of war against
the aggrieved citizens (who, in part, empowered the sovereign in the first place) if it were a
serious enough threat to liberty or property. Id.
316 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 8:291
where crime deterrence and criminal prosecution are most needed.
160
The difficulty resides in the fact that the law enforcement efforts are
extensive and highly coercive but woefully unmatched by other
services or by remediation of other chronic problems. Through
EXILE, federal authorities prosecuted and removed nearly two
hundred persons from poor Baltimore neighborhoods last year,' 6' but
the schools in these areas are still by far the worst in the state, 162 the
housing stock is dangerous,' 63 and economic opportunity is close to
non-existent. 164 Lastly, the crime rate does not appear to be abating
despite the partnership.'
1 65
Under a Hobbesean view, EXILE likely represents a wholly
appropriate exercise of authority. Sovereign power is absolute and
effectively unchallengeable. 166 The primary goal and singular promise
of a sovereign is to provide protection for all members of a
commonwealth. 167 EXILE seeks to protect residents of inner city
Baltimore and the greater society through tough enforcement in areas
where the concentration of felons is high and lawbreaking is common.
Whether the tactics (i) ignore other crime-rich areas of the state; (ii)
create an oppressive atmosphere for all residents of the target areas; or
(iii) far outpace affirmative services afforded other state residents is
not of consequence to their legitimacy under Hobbes' view. At best,
target area residents could argue that law enforcement is failing to live
up to its duty to protect them properly, but that would not throw into
question the legitimacy of EXILE as an exercise of power.
The Lockean calculus is far less clear, but EXILE may
represent a breach of the trust placed in the sovereign because such
enforcement looks like an "act of war" against residents of poor
Baltimore neighborhoods. Locke asserted that sovereign power
remains legitimate only so long as it protects the people and respects
160. Midday with Dan Rodricks: Interview with United States Attorney Rod Rosenstein
and Baltimore State's Attorney Patricia Jessamy (WYPR radio broadcast Feb. 27, 2008).
161. Jones, supra note 35, at 6B.
162. See generally Maryland Report Card, Maryland State Department of Education
(2007) (providing public school assessment data for all districts statewide), available at
http://www.mdreportcard.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
163. SANDRA J. NEWMAN, Low END RENTAL HOUSING: THE FORGOTTEN STORY IN
BALTIMORE'S HOUSING BOOM, 14-19 (Urban Institute 2005); Hanscom, supra note 6, at 58,
61.
164. The Market Is Failing Low Wage Baltimoreans, THE ABELL REPORT, Aug. 2007, at
1.
165. Andy Rosen, GBC Report: Baltimore Region's Progress Is Threatened by Crime,
Traffic, DAILY REC. (Baltimore, Md.), Dec. 21, 2007.
166. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 97, 117.
167. Id.
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their rights to liberty and property.' 6 8 He stated that the government
puts itself into a state of war with the people if it seizes or destroys
their property or arbitrarily commits acts of oppression against
them. 169 At such times, persons are "absolved from any further
obedience" and may seek refuge amongst themselves. 7 ' EXILE and
other similar forms of law enforcement, like Baltimore's "blue light
cameras,"1 71 suggest that poor Baltimore neighborhoods exist in a kind
of police state where individual liberty and dignity are reduced and
government can exercise greater-than-normal powers. EXILE could be
viewed as a threat to, and a continuing punishment of, the large
population of ex-offenders in Baltimore, regardless of whether they
commit illegal acts after returning to the community from prison. As
stated above, economic opportunity and basic social services like
functional schools do not exist in these neighborhoods on the same
scale that they do in the wealthier parts of the state and nationwide. By
concentrating resources on police work while failing to do other jobs
effectively, government could be charged with the destruction of
property in the form of economic agency and opportunity. This
conception might be foreign to Locke, but it would comport with
contemporary notions of property rights. 172 And, sovereign powers
could be faulted for failing even to create safe streets despite all their
efforts. Combined, these actions and inactions, concentrated against
168. LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 220-24.
169. Id. § 222.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Luke Broadwater, Prosecutors: Stats Show Blue Light Cameras Not
Getting Results, THE EXAMINER (Baltimore, Md.), Jan. 22, 2007. In 2005, the City State's
Attorney Office in Baltimore began installing almost 300 cameras on poles above Baltimore's
streets. Id. Law enforcement placed most of the cameras in poor neighborhoods and equipped
them with flashing blue lights to draw attention to the surveillance. Id. The City State's
Attorney funded the camera project with a combination of state funds, federal homeland
security funds, and money seized from drug busts. Id. See also Stephen Janis, Blue Light
Special, BALT. CITY PAPER, Aug. 17, 2005.
172. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due
Process, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 731 (1990). Reich, a much-lauded modem theorist on property
rights, asserted in this article that persons in America should have a due process right to
minimum subsistence and housing as well as to the tools necessary to improve economic
agency and standing, such as education, health care, and other necessaries in a modem
"centrally managed economy." Id. at 733. Reich saw these tangibles and intangibles as
property rights. Id. at 735-37. Reich's earlier assertions (in his article The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964)), that services and compensation promised by the government create a
property right in those slated to receive them, have been widely accepted among scholars and
courts. See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100
YALE L.J. 1449, 1462 (1991) (revealing that Reich's New Property is the most-cited article
ever published by the journal).
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specific communities in Baltimore, could be viewed as acts of war by
a government against its people.
On the other hand, Locke looked to the majority of society for
ratification of controversial government actions. 73 Most Marylanders
likely would support EXILE and greater law enforcement focus in
these neighborhoods. The majority culture, and government officials,
might argue that EXILE and similar programs are not intended to
oppress law-abiding individuals, but instead seek to protect them and
free them from the harms of chronic lawbreaking in their communities.
By the same token, however, any rejection of government authority as
expressed through Stop Snitching and other forms of non-participation
would represent legitimate dissent to Locke. 174 And the fact that these
communities are physically and demographically distinct, and that
they lack significant political power, suggests that they could act (or
silently dissent) against arbitrary exercises of power despite support
for EXILE by the majority culture. 175
The legitimacy of EXILE under a contractarian view, therefore,
is difficult to confirm. Hobbes very likely would ratify it so long as the
sovereign intended to protect residents. Under Locke's lens, EXILE
looks like an over-application of sovereign power and infringement on
liberty and dignity, no matter how needed it may be. In terms of
effectiveness, these Lockean concerns undermine the statistical
successes of approximately two hundred prosecutions in a single
year. 176 EXILE looks far less effective if it serves to balkanize poor
neighborhoods and to erode further the confidence of their residents in
the work of their government. If Jane Jacobs presented a pragmatic
view of how the social contract works on the street,' 77 EXILE stands
as an example of its opposite, where law enforcement acts unilaterally
and hopes only secondarily that neighbors will join the fight.
D. Refusing to Participate: Are Residents of Baltimore Breaching the
Social Contract?
Residents of poor Baltimore neighborhoods likely do not
improperly breach the social contract if they refuse to aid law
enforcement and instead reject the sovereign powers supported by the
173. LOCKE, supra note 42, at § 242.
174. Id. § 233.
175. LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 199-201, 208-10 (outlining "tyrannical" acts by
officers of sovereign powers).
176. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part III.A.
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majority society. The silence bred by an effort like Stop Snitching
probably represents legitimate protest against what residents view as
ineffective and authoritarian government conduct. I deliberately limit
the examination here to community members who are (i) not coerced
into silence; and (ii) not currently engaged in criminal conduct.
Witness intimidation is a serious crime, and if a person avoids
reporting illegal activity to police under that kind of coercion, she is in
no way rejecting the social contract. Furthermore, wrongdoers who
elect to avoid reporting crime, whether their own or that of others,
have reasons apart from the health of a social contract or their
neighborhood for staying mum.
As a general matter, there is no positive legal obligation in the
United States for ordinary citizens to report crime.17 Maryland has no
specific requirement to report criminal conduct, save for persons in
certain positions of responsibility. 79 The obligation that each
individual shoulders under a social contract is to submit to sovereign
authority and the laws it effectuates and enforces.' 80 Likely, though,
there also exists a more general obligation, a moral obligation rather
than a positive legal duty, to assist in promoting law and order.'1
8
For the voluntary adopter of the silence urged by Stop
Snitching, refusal to support and engage with police probably
represents a form of resistance toward, and rejection of, sovereign
authority. Rodney Bethea claims that his video Stop Snitching is just
such a cry against over-application of coercive power and under-
implementation of social services.' 8 2 A good deal of empirical
evidence supports the assertion that silence equals rejection of
sovereign authority and the will of the majority society. 8 3 For
example, in January 2008, African American leaders in Baltimore
publicly refused to condemn the "Stop Snitching mindset" and called
178. There is a federal offense of "misprision of felony" which resembles failure to report
crime. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Courts generally require proof that the defendant to a misprision
charge actively sought to obscure or hide criminal conduct by another. See, e.g., United States
v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1992).
179. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW, § 5-704 (West 2007) (requiring health
practitioners, police, educators, and human service workers to report child abuse). Though
adopted by the state with the rest of English common law, misprision of felony is no longer a
crime in Maryland. Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1078-79 (Md. 1979).
180. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 96-98; LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 129-30.
181. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 145 (discussing "fundamentall" obligations of subjects);
LocKE, supra note 42, at §§ 95-99.
182. Julie Bykowicz, supra note 14, at lB.
183. Kane, supra note 7, at IB; Jones, supra note 19, at lB. See also Edelson, supra note
130, at 65, 69 (describing a program to prevent and mediate disputes that acknowledges
residents' rejection of law enforcement).
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instead for equal enforcement of criminal and civil laws in realms
other than the inner city and wider demands by society and
government for all individuals to serve as "whistleblowers" to
wrongdoing.184 Recent studies of Baltimore neighborhoods
demonstrate a lack of investment in the larger society, high incidences
of depression, and pervasive safety concerns. 181 If residents of
neighborhoods like Sandtown-Winchester and Greater Mondawmin
are refusing to help police, even at the potential cost of greater crime
on their streets, they likely are signaling that: (i) they disagree with
law enforcement tactics (reflecting a liberty interest); (ii) they do not
trust that programs like EXILE make their communities safer
(reflecting an interest in safety and security); or (iii) they have more
pressing needs that authorities are failing to meet (reflecting an interest
in property and general welfare).
Breaking the "unwritten law" or moral expectation that citizens
must work with police and alert them of serious wrongdoing resembles
jury nullification. 186 Jurors do not have a positive legal obligation to
apply the law correctly to the facts in determining a verdict; instead,
there is a strong moral expectation that they will do so. 187 When jurors
believe that correct application of the law will lead to an unjust result,
they sometimes violate the expectation. 188 In a real sense, this is a
breach of the social contract because such jurors have taken back their
"natural" right to determine wrongdoing. 189 Even though they act
within a society and under the watch of sovereign powers, nullifying
jurors effectively take the law into their own hands and determine
what is just for the particular circumstances. 190 Non-participation with
law enforcement may amount to a similar practice. If residents of
Baltimore determine that the acts of the sovereign chronically infringe
184. Jones, supra note 19, at I B (describing a community meeting where black leaders
from political, legal, religious, and other community spheres refused to condemn a new Stop
Snitching video, filmmaker Rodney Bethea, or the attitude of silence that pervades poor
Baltimore neighborhoods).
185. Cf BALTIMORE CITY DEPT. OF PLANNING, SMALL AREA PLAN: BARCLAY-MIDWAY-
OLD GOUCHER 48 (2005), available at http://www.baltimorecity.gov/govemment/
planning/images/SAPBarclay-Midway-OldGoucher.pdf; Kimberly Haven, Who's Not Voting
in Maryland?, THE EXAMINER (Baltimore, Md.), Sept. 13, 2006; High Incidence of Depression
Among the City's Poor, THE ABELL REPORT, Aug. 2004, at 1.
186. See supra Part III.D.
187. Id.
188. See supra Part II.D.
189. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 68-69; LOCKE, supra note 42, at § 13 (both discussing
how, in the state of nature, humans each have equal power to judge the conduct of others for
wrongdoing).
190. Cf Butler, supra note 116, at 700-03.
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on their interests, they may choose to breach moral expectations of
society as a way of acting for justice and of announcing that current
policies are wrong. The "trust" placed in the hands of a juror is much
weightier than that carried by the ordinary citizen, and a juror's
decision in a criminal case (particularly a decision to acquit) has a
significant impact and finality. The lesser weight of the individual
Stop Snitching decision, however, should not obscure the overall
impact and significance of the silent objection of large segments of an
entire community.
Under a Hobbesean view, participation by citizens in Stop
Snitching directly violates the social contract unless comporting with
the expectations of the sovereign places the individuals at risk of
immediate harm. Hobbes likely would consider Stop Snitching wholly
unacceptable because it represents "seditious doctrine," promotion of
individual judgment over sovereign authority, and aggrandizement of
certain individuals or ideas over stability and safety. 19 In Hobbes'
view, the sovereign determines how best to protect subjects.' So long
as the sovereign is safeguarding subjects and not forcing them to place
themselves in harm's way, they must obey. 193 Here, law enforcement
is trying to protect law-abiding residents by aggressively pursuing and
removing wrongdoers. 194 To any claim that the streets are still filled
with danger, Hobbes would respond that without positive law and
sovereign power, absolute chaos and continual violence would
reign. 195 In other words, life would be much worse in these areas
without law enforcement. Accordingly, "getting tough on crime" is the
fundamental duty of sovereign powers, leaving residents little valid
recourse to protest or act against over-application or under-resourcing.
Because he was equally concerned with preserving liberty and
property as with the rule of law, Locke might view the situation in
Baltimore differently. EXILE and similar enforcement practices may
well infringe liberties; they certainly erode the dignity of the residents
of target neighborhoods without solving the problem of chronic crime.
Locke was very concerned with property and insisted that one of the
main goals of forming a social contract was to protect property and
191. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 163-4.
192. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 133.
193. Id.
194. See supra Part I.B; BALTIMORE EXILE: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note
23, at 8.
195. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 102 ("Sovereigne Power not so hurtfull as the want of
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allow persons to thrive economically.' 96  Residents of target
neighborhoods are the poorest in Maryland. 197 In addition, if
acquisition and possession of property in the contemporary age
requires education and economic opportunities198-both factors that
implicate government policies and programs 99-residents of poor
neighborhoods in Baltimore have far less chance to thrive
economically than the rest of society.2°° So again, the over-application
of coercive power combined with the under-implementation of
government services commonly provided to others within the social
contract suggest grounds for legitimate protest under a Lockean view.
Baltimoreans who willingly espouse Stop Snitching may be getting far
less than their fair share of liberty, property, and protection because of
who they are and where they live. Protesting against sovereign power
and repudiating social contract responsibilities are understandable, and
likely proper, reactions.
Lastly, it is necessary to ask whether residents of target
neighborhoods in Baltimore properly consent to the social contract that
would require them to comport with positive law and moral
expectation. Hobbes would say yes; they reside in the commonwealth
and benefit from the protections of the sovereign. 20 1 Locke, however,
stated that possession and enjoyment of property in a commonwealth
represents a form of consent to be governed by the appointed
20220sovereign. As stated above,20 3 if enjoyment of property in the
modem age requires certain services and largesse furnished by the
sovereign, and if residents of target neighborhoods are chronically
excluded from these baseline fruits of the social contract, there is an
argument that they have not consented to the covenant or subjected
themselves to governance. Some contemporary commentators might
say that residents voluntarily live in Maryland, that they benefit from
infrastructure, that many of them affirmatively seek government
benefits, so there is no way to conclude a lack of consent. 214 Others,
196. LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 25-51, 124.
197. See notes 134, 155 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, President's Council of Economic Advisors,
Address at the National Economists Club 1, 4-9 (Oct. 11, 2005) (transcript available on the
White House website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/econ-oppty20051011.html (last
visited June 20, 2008)).
199. Id.
200. Seesupra notes 161, 163.
201. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 74-75.
202. LOCKE, supra note 42, at §§ 117-120.
203. See supra notes 171, 197 and accompanying text.
204. Harry Beran, supra note 94, at 271.
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205like Hanna Pitkin, might be sympathetic to non-consent arguments.
While the federal and Maryland governments act justly in the main,
there is substance to claims that they act unjustly toward these discrete
communities, as discussed above.2 0 6 This chronic injustice provides
legitimate grounds for denying consent.
Pitkin's consent theory207 offers a useful counterpoint to
Locke's deference to majority rule when conflicts arise. She asserts
that the duty to obey or consent rests with what ought to be obeyed,
and she goes on to state that individuals should resist and reject what is
clearly unjust, whether acceptable to the majority or not. °Resistance
(or refusal to consent) must be "appropriate" and based on rational,
principled decision making. 209 It follows that in circumstances where
the sovereign acts justly most of the time, but regularly applies
coercive power and distributes services to one group in a different and
unjust fashion, that group has good grounds to protest despite the
majority view. The group also would have grounds to withdraw or
renounce consent to the social contract if they chronically could not
remedy the injustice.
As with the primary analysis of the Lockean view above, the
issue of consent does not conclusively show that Baltimore residents
are correct in their choices. It still suggests, however, that something is
very wrong, and that residents of targets neighborhoods may be
justified in breaching the moral expectations of the majority society by
not talking.
E. Summary: The Erosion of the Covenant in Baltimore
In a contractarian sense, something is very wrong in poor
neighborhoods in Baltimore. To the proponent of Thomas Hobbes, the
trouble likely amounts to rebellious notions by residents and an
improper, if not illegal, disrespect for sovereign authority.
Accordingly, such an advocate would view EXILE and like law
enforcement practices as appropriate policies to keep the peace and
promote stability; she would view the attitudes of Stop Snitching
adherents as potentially seditious. From a Lockean perspective, the
situation is far more complex and less clear. EXILE threatens the
liberty and dignity of residents in target neighborhoods while failing to
205. Pitkin, supra note 101, at 39.
206. See supra Part III.C.
207. Pitkin, supra note 101, at 39.
208. Id. at 42.
209. Id. at 44, 52.
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end chronic crime. Other government policies, or the shortcomings
thereof, appear to provide less than the common baseline standard for
social services and economic opportunity expected by residents of
Maryland and the United States. As a result, residents of
neighborhoods targeted by EXILE may be sending a message of
protest to authorities and the majority society by refusing to act as
other citizens do. This protest likely is justified, despite majority
support for "tough on crime" practices, because the balance between
sovereign power and individual interests is clearly upset in Baltimore
and because chronic injustice suggests that residents of targeted
neighborhoods are less obligated to submit.
IV. AN AMERICAN SOLUTION: REPAIRING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN
BALTIMORE
Since the tragic murder of the Dawson family in 2002, the
problem of crime in Baltimore has not abated, but instead may have
worsened.21 As disturbing, low-income African American
communities appear less trusting of law enforcement and other
authorities in recent years despite growing government expenditures to
combat and harshly punish criminal activity. Why is the EXILE
"tough on crime" approach leading to the erosion of the social contract
that undergirds government authority?
State and federal authorities need to consider the social
contract, and the participation of community residents, when forging
law enforcement policy and programs. Lockean sociopolitical ideas,
not the doctrines of Hobbes, provided the foundation for Maryland and
the United States. Government authority to ensure safety and stability
must be circumscribed by concerns for individual interests, for the
rights to liberty and property. The coercive powers of government
should be responsive to citizens, particularly to legitimate acts of
dissent against state action. The current situation in Baltimore
demonstrates that a policy does not have to be unconstitutional to
weaken the social contract. When policies appear to fail or to result in
more problems than positive outcomes, authorities should look to the
interests of citizens to reconsider and redraw the policies. That is
exactly what needs to be done with EXILE and other aggressive law
enforcement programs in Baltimore.
210. See supra Part III.C.
211. Melody Simmons, Home Where Family Died Is Now Safe Haven, N.Y. TIMEs, April
8, 2007.
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EXILE does not address any lack of moral outrage at
criminality in these particular communities or the concurrent rejection
of government authority implied by residents' silence. It does not
support citizens like Angela Dawson, nor does it encourage the kind of
unwritten partnerships, described by Jane Jacobs, 212 that grow out of a
functioning social contract. Instead, EXILE, blue light cameras, and
the like create an adversarial stance between the majority society and
particular communities in Baltimore. Aggressive messaging and policy
create a sense of occupation rather than conveying that government
exists to protect residents of Baltimore and to help them succeed in
acquiring and developing property.
Approaches instead should seek to link the majority society
and these "balkanized" communities, as well as to encourage
productive partnerships between law enforcement and residents. 21
Instead of trying to cut the cancer out of neighborhoods, government
should seek ways to attract and gain substantive consent for exercises
of government authority.214 This may require bringing government
services in Baltimore up to state or national averages by providing
effective public education and genuine economic opportunity. The
Hobbesean view of protection as the paramount value is insufficient.
Sovereign powers must also support-if not promote-individual
liberty, dignity, and acquisition of property.21 5
The irony is that EXILE and Stop Snitching, two "programs"
arising from very opposite places both practically and philosophically,
have combined in Baltimore to create a single negative outcome.
Government leaders and policymakers have the most leverage to
address this problem. They should do so in a fashion that honors the
philosophical foundations of our social contract and sovereign powers
by considering the interests and concerns of the residents of the target
neighborhoods in Baltimore.
212. See supra Part III.A.
213. Id.
214. See supra Part II.C (examining theories of consent to the social contract).
215. See supra Part II.B (outlining Locke's concern for maintaining the maximum
measure of individual liberty permitted under social contract).
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